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The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine and
Impossibility Arguments
Struan Scott*
This article considers whether English law should allow a director to argue that if
the company is unable to exploit a corporate opportunity, the director should be
free to exploit it personally. The article supports the view of the Company Law
Review Steering Group that the answer should remain no. In so doing it analyses
US practice to show that, even where such arguments are recognised, they are
difficult to prove and their potential application is curtailed through the development
of satellite rules. Indeed, in practical terms there may be no significant
difference between the Steering Group's recommendations and the position
towards which US law appears to be moving.
Introduction
Should a business opportunity, incapable of exploitation by a company, be regarded
as that company's opportunity and, as such, be unavailable for unauthorised
exploitation by a director thereof? This was one of the many questions raised by the
Company Law Review Steering Group.' It is not a new question. The orthodox
answer given in Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver2 is that a company's opportunity
does not cease to be so merely because the company is unable to exploit it, for
example because the company is unable to finance the opportunity's acquisition.' In
so doing the court followed the approach established in Keech v Sandford.4
As evidenced by the responses to the Steering Group's Consultation documents -
Developing the Framework5 and Completing the Structure6 - the orthodox answer
retains considerable support7 (including the support of the Steering Group8 and
* Faculty of Law, University of Otago, New Zealand.
1 The Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy,
Completing the Structure DTI Pub URN 00/1335 (Nov 2000) (hereafter Completing the
Structure) 42-44, 51.
2 [1967] 2 AC 134n.
3 ibid 159. See also J. Lowry and R. Edmunds, 'The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine: The Shifting
of the Duty and its Remedies' (1998) 61 MLR 515, 516 (citing P. L. Davies, Gower's Principles of
Modern Company Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 6th ed, 1997) 617).
4 (1726) 25 ER 223.
5 The Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy,
Developing the Framework DTI Pub URN 00/656 (March 2000).
6 Completing the Structure, n 1 above.
7 For example Arthur Anderson responded: '[w]e do not see it as a responsibility of company law
to protect directors from personal loss through not being able to exploit opportunities outwith
their roles as company directors.' Response of Arthur Anderson to Completing the Structure,
ibid, as contained in Reponses to the Consultation Document 'Completing the Structure,'
Corporate Governance: Scope (Chapter 3) doc 93 at http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/reviews.comp-
strust.htm (last visited 12 August 2003).
8 The Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy,
Final Report DTI Pub URN 01/942 and URN 01/943 (June 2001) 3.22-3.27.
8 u The Modern Law Review Limited 2003. (MLR 66:6, November). Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.,852 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Maiden, MA 02148, USA.
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the Government9). Reform is seen as better achieved through conferring an ability
on the board l° to authorise the director's exploitation of the opportunity. But, just
as the result in Regal (Hastings) attracted criticism, l' so too does the orthodox
answer. Representative of this is the following negative response to the Steering
Group - that '[n]ot to allow directors to chase such opportunities ... [is]
damaging to entrepreneurial activity. ' 12 This respondent also suggested that a
director should be allowed to exploit an opportunity if he or she can show that the
company 'would not' have done so 'at the time.' 13
While the debate on what can be called 'the impossibility argument' is just one
aspect of the wider question, 'when is a business opportunity an "opportunity of
the company"?" 14 it is an important aspect. Not only does it help define the ambit
of what constitutes a company's opportunity but it also invites consideration of
the role of directors.
Delaware law provides some support for advocates favouring adoption of an
impossibility argument. Delaware is the 'leading ' 5 US state for the incorporation
of public companies and its case law has been described as 'probably the
richest. ' 17 Guth v Loft, Inc18 is a prime example. If not the 'quintessential 'i 9 corpo-
rate opportunity case, Guth is probably the most-cited one.20 It is credited with
establishing what has become the prominent US corporate opportunity test,2 1 the
so-called line-of-business test. For many who argue that English law should
recognise an impossibility argument, the line-of-business test is significant because
it expressly recognizes that the company's financial ability to acquire and develop
9 White Paper, Modernising Company Law, Cm 5553-I (July 2002) (hereafter White Paper) para
3.20; White Paper, Modernising Company Law-Draft Clauses, Cm 5553-I (July 2002) (hereafter
White Paper-Draft Clauses) s 19; Sched 2, para 6.
10 The Steering Group recommended that boards of private companies should have the ability to
authorise such use unless the company's constitution provided otherwise. But for public
companies the recommendation was that the company's constitution would have to confer this
power. In both cases the board is the board acting without the participation of any interested
director. This recommendation has been adopted in the draft Companies Bill, see White Paper-
Draft Clauses, ibid Sched 2, para 6.
11 Most of the criticism has been directed to the 'unexpected windfall' obtained by the Company
(Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46, 157). See G. Jones, 'Unjust Enrichment and the Fiduciary's
Duty of Loyalty' (1968) 84 LQR 472, 732; Davies, n 3 above, 616.
12 Response of the Institute of Directors to the Consultation Document Completing the Structure,
Corporate Governance: Scope (Chapter 3), doc 156, n 7 above.
13 ibid. See also the response of the Law Society, ibid doc 149.
14 This is the phrase employed by the Steering Group and carried over into the draft Companies
Bill: see White Paper, n 9 above, para 3.20; White Paper-Draft Clauses, n 9 above, Sched 2, para 6.
15 D. DeMott, 'The Figure in the Landscape: A Comparative Sketch of Directors' Self-dealing
Transactions' (1999) 62 Law & Contemp Probs 243, 244.
16 Throughout this article when discussing US law the term 'company' has been used rather than'corporation.'
17 K. B. Davis Jr, 'Judicial Review of Fiduciary Decisionmaking - Some Theoretical Perspectives'
(1985) 80 Nw U L Rev 1, 61.
18 5 A2d 503 (Del 1939).
19 E. G. Orlinski, 'Corporate Opportunity Doctrine and Interested Director Transactions: A
Framework for Analysis in an Attempt to Restore Predictability' (1999) 24 Del J Corp L 451,
466.
20 P. K. Chew, 'Competing Interests in the Corporate Opportunities Doctrine' (1989) 67 NCL Rev
435, 455.
21 Other prominent US answers are: (i) the interest/expectancy test, see Lagarde v Anniston Lime &
Stone Co 28 So 199 (Ala 1900); (ii) the Massachusetts' fairness test, see Durfee v Durfee &
Canning, Inc 80 NE2d 522 (Mass 1947); (iii) the two-step test (which combines the line-of-
business test with the fairness test, see Miller v Miller 222 NW2d 71 (Minn 1974); and (iv) the
test proposed by the American Law Institute: Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and
Recommendations (St Paul, Minn: American Law Institute Publishers, 1994) (hereafter
'Corporate Governance') s. 5.05.
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an opportunity is a relevant consideration in determining whether the opportunity
should be regarded as the company's. This is said to be 'a welcome and realistic
position [for English law] to adopt.'
22
Following Guth, the application of impossibility arguments gained a measure of
acceptance in the US. This may have been encouraged by US adoption of the
fairness, or fair-dealing, conception of corporate fiduciary loyalty, discussed
below.23 To the extent that fairness to the company is seen as not harming the
company, there is a logic in allowing a corporate fiduciary to raise arguments that
the company was not harmed by the action in issue. Nevertheless, impossibility
arguments remain controversial. Moreover, even in those jurisdictions that
acknowledge impossibility arguments, these arguments remain difficult to prove
and there is a trend towards limiting their application by the creation of satellite
rules imposing disclosure and/or authorisation requirements.
To assist in the debate on whether English law should recognise impossibility
arguments, this article provides a general review of US reactions to impossibility
arguments. In the context of this review, the article also considers the role of
directors. The intention is to negate the suggestion made by some that English
law's current rejection of impossibility arguments is a consequence of an un-
thinking application of the 'ancient decision' 24 of Keech v Sandford to incorporate
1 8 th and 19 century family trust principles into company law.25 Underlying such
suggestions are two inter-related arguments aimed at supporting the recognition
of an impossibility argument. The first argument is that either the duty of loyalty
owed by directors or the application of that duty should differ from the duty owed
by other fiduciaries. The second argument is that while impossibility arguments
may be inappropriate for some fiduciaries (ie the trustee of the family trust) they
may be appropriate for others, in particular directors.
US law appears to support both arguments. It accepts that just as different types
of fiduciary relationships attract different duties, the application of the duty of
loyalty may differ between types of fiduciaries. 26 Illustrating this is a recognition
that the law's response to self-dealing by corporate fiduciaries should differ from
its response to other fiduciaries (such as trustees).27 Advocates of impossibility
arguments gain further encouragement from the suggestion of some commentators
that, underlying this development, was a concern that the strict application of
traditional fiduciary principles would impede commercial activity which was
motivated by corporate fiduciary self-interest. As was noted earlier, similar concerns
were presented to the Steering Group to support the impossibility argument.
29
Despite these developments, there is also US recognition that impossibility
arguments may be inconsistent with a director's role, and this supports limiting
the use of such arguments. Some companies (in particular public companies)
depend on their directors (especially inside or executive directors) to identify and
then acquire appropriate business opportunities for the company's exploitation.
22 Lowry and Edmunds, n 3 above, 521. See also J. Lowry and R. Edmunds, 'The No Conflict-No
Profit Rules and the Corporate Fiduciary: Challenging the Orthodoxy of Absolutism' [2000]
JBL 122, 125.
23 Discussed in the text to n 95-n 101 below.
24 P. D. Finn, Fiduciary Obligations (Sydney: Law Book Company, 1977) para 568.
25 Lowry and Edmunds, n 3 above, 517.
26 A. W. Scott, 'The Fiduciary Principle' (1949) 37 Calif L Rev 539, 541.
27 Discussed in the text to n 96-n 101 below.
28 See W. W. Bratton, 'Self-Regulation, Normative Choice, and the Structure of Corporate
Fiduciary Law' (1993) 61 Geo Wash L Rev 1084, 1101.
29 Discussed in the text to n 12-n 13 above.
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In so doing, a director may be required to develop or approve strategies to
overcome any difficulties preventing the company's acquisition or exploitation of
the opportunity. This practice illustrates the wider principle endorsed by the
Steering Group, that the director's role is to 'promote the success of the company. 30
The outcome of this article's review of US reactions to impossibility arguments,
and its reflections on the director's role, is to support the Steering Group's implicit
recommendation (and its adoption by the Government) that the status of an
opportunity should not depend upon whether the opportunity is capable of
exploitation by the company.
Guth and the line-of-business test
Guth was the President and dominant director of Loft Inc ('Loft'). As such, he
dominated Loft's management. 31 Loft was primarily involved in the retail sale of
candies, beverages, and foodstuffs.32 A smaller part of its business was manufacturing
syrups for use in soft drinks, and participating in wholesale activities. The
case involved Guth's acquisition of the Pepsi-Cola formula and trademark. While
Guth's ideas33 of selling Pepsi in twelve ounce bottles34 and having licensing
agreements with bottlers were important, if not crucial, for transforming Pepsi
from a regional drink into a nationwide competitor for Coca-Cola, so too were
Loft's financial,35 manufacturing,36 developmental,37 and retailing 38 assistance.
This assistance was provided at Guth's direction and without the knowledge or
consent of Loft's board.39 The court concluded that Guth's activities constituted a
breach of loyalty and, in essence, imposed a constructive trust over the Pepsi
business in favour of Loft.40
In so doing the court recognised that the director's role was evolving and that this
had implications for defining corporate opportunities. Prior to Guth, the prominent
US corporate opportunity test had been the so-called interest/expectancy test.
The interest/expectancy test
The interest/expectancy test is attributed to Lagarde v Anniston Lime & Stone
Co,4 1 and associates corporate opportunities with opportunities in which the
30 To use the language of the draft Companies Bill, see White Paper, n 8 above; White Paper-Draft
Clauses, n 9 above, Sched 2, para 2.
31 Guth, n 18 above, 509.
32 ibid 505 (Loft had 115 stores).
33 ibid 515 (Guth may have been a 'genius in his line').
34 ibid 507 (Guth claimed credit for this idea). This size bottle was highly popular with Depression
era consumers and formed the core of Pepsi's advertising for many years. See N. McFadden,
The Pepsi Generation: Fifty Year Story of Pepsi-Cola in Canada 1934-1984 (Toronto: Pepsi-Cola
Canada, 1984) 9.
35 Guth, n 18 above, 506 (at one time Guth had almost all Loft's working capital. engaged in the
Pepsi's development).
36 ibid 506-507 (Loft made the syrup concentrate and prepared the directions for its mixing).
37 ibid 506 (Loft's chemists developed the syrup).
38 ibid 507 (Loft's stores replaced Coca-Cola with Pepsi (in the process incurring a loss of profits
estimated at $300,000) and, where previously they had spent nothing on advertising, spent at
least $20,000 on advertising Pepsi).
39 ibid 506.
40 Guth and a family company owned by him were ordered to transfer their shares in the Pepsi-
Cola Company to Loft and account for dividends they had received.
41 n 21 above.
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company has some pre-existing property interest, or, to use the language of this
test, opportunities in which the company has an interest or which it has a
recognized expectancy of acquiring.
In Lagarde, three parties - the Anniston Lime & Stone Co, Christopher, and
Martin - each owned one-third of a valuable quarry. In addition, the company
had a lease of, and an option to buy, Christopher's land. Members of the Lagarde
family became stockholders in the company, and two of them were both directors
and officers (ie executive directors). While they were corporate fiduciaries, the
Lagardes, personally, acquired Christopher's land. In evaluating this behaviour,
the court concluded that the key question was whether the company had either 'an
interest already existing' in those parcels of land, or 'an expectancy growing out
of an existing right.' 42 Underlying this formulation was a perceived equivalence
between restrictions on corporate fiduciaries acquiring opportunities personally
and trustee dealings with trust property.43 Not surprisingly, given the company's
option over the land, the Lagardes were held to have breached their fiduciary
obligations in purchasing the Christopher land. The result may be justified on the
basis of the La ardes' interference with a pre-existing contractual right enjoyed by
the company.uBut the court also employed property reasoning, and equated both
the option and the right to renew the lease as the company's beneficial or equitable
property. Specifically, the option was regarded as creating an 'interest' in the
Christopher land and, in reasoning reminiscent of Keech v Sandford,46 the
court concluded that the company, as the existing lessee, also had an expectancy
in the lease being renewed.47 Both the option and lease, therefore, were regarded
as conferring upon the company a beneficial interest in Christopher's land. Thus
the Lagardes' actions could be analogised to the misappropriation of trust
property.48
The interest/expectancy test has some attractive characteristics. Prominent
amongst them is the association of corporate opportunities with corporate
property. Assuming one agrees with the conclusion that a property right exists and
has been infringed, an 'infringement of property' test can provide a relatively non-
controversial and, hence, attractive justification for judicial intervention. Absent
authorisation, a corporate fiduciary may not personally exploit an opportunity
that belongs to the company: it is misappropriation to do so. The simplicity of this
conclusion is a strength of the interest/expectancy test. Nevertheless, the simplicity
of the conclusion may encourage some to overlook the fact that the recognition
of a property interest is the product of an earlier policy decision. The point is that
while the protection of property rights is an established judicial concern, the
recognition of a property interest is the product of an earlier policy decision. For
example, in Lagarde the court simply accepted two earlier policy decisions as to
situations where an equitable interest in land can arise. In short, an option to buy
land and, at least in some circumstances, a lessee's expectation that a lease will be
renewed, can confer an equitable interest in that land. Unfortunately the impact of
42 ibid 201.
43 ibid.
44 R. A. Epstein, 'Contract and Trust in Corporate Law: The Case of Corporate Opportunity'
(1996) 21 Del J Corp Law 5, 14.
45 This is consistent with English law pursuant to which an option to purchase is regarded as
conferring an equitable interest. See London and South Western Ry Co v Gomm (1882) 20 Ch
D 562, 581 CA; Bevin v Smith [1994] 3 NZLR 648, 665 CA.
46 n 4 above.
47 Lagarde, n 21 above, 201.
48 ibid 201.




these policy considerations is hidden by the now-accepted orthodoxy of the first
decision, and the ability to justify the second decision as an extension of the
application of the rule in Keech v Sandford.49 Thus, underlying the apparently
'neutral' interest/expectancy test (neutral in the sense that this test purports to be
simply protecting pre-existing property rights), is the question 'why did the courts
recognize a property interest here?' Despite its importance, this question is easily
overlooked when property rights are claimed. So, while the simplicity of the
interest/expectancy test is a strength of the test, that same simplicity is also a
weakness. As an aside, rightly or wrongly, the draft Companies Bill 50 continues to
use the language of property when referring to a company's opportunity. It does
this without giving guidance as to exactly when the opportunity is considered to be
the company's. The missing step is left to the courts.
A new dimension to a director's loyalty
Returning to Guth and the line-of-business test, that test was a significant advance
because it recognized that the director's role was evolving and that this had
implications for the loyalty required of directors (and senior employees in a fiduciary
relationship with the company), especially in defining corporate opportunities.
The director's new role was to identify and acquire business opportunities for the
company. This generated a new concern for corporate fiduciary law: it had to
prevent unauthorised personal exploitation of opportunities that the fiduciary
should have referred to the company. The result was to impose upon directors,
and some senior employees, an obligation to advise the company of certain
opportunities and, unless authorised to do so, not to acquire them personally.
This development mirrored the changing nature of the company, in particular
the separation of ownership from control highlighted in the 1930's by Berle and
Means.5 1 However, there are different varieties of companies. Indeed, the typical
image of a company is the owner-operator company, exemplified by the one-
person or family-run corner convenience store or engineering plant. Ignoring any
nominal shareholders and corporate officials who are there to satisfy statutory
requirements, such companies revolve around a small group of individuals. The
distinguishing characteristic of these companies is that the same group both owns
and operates the business.
In the owner-operated company, the owner-operators are entrepreneurs upon
whom the ultimate success of the company depends. In such companies, the
corporate form is a device to distance the company legally from its members so
as to achieve a number of perceived advantages resulting from the company's
distinct corporate personality. 52 Not only do the owner-operators run these
companies in their own self-interest, but 'the philosophy surrounding the
49 n 4 above.
50 The Draft Companies Bill provides that '[a] director or former director of a company must not
use for his own or anyone else's benefit any property or information of the company, or any
opportunity of the company which he became aware of in the performance of his functions as
director, unless ... ' see White Paper-Draft Clauses, n 9 above, Sched 2, para 6.
51 A. A. Berle and G. C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New Brunswick,
NJ: Transaction Publishers, M. Weidenbaum and M. Means ed, 1991 (originally published
1932)).
52 Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22.
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institution of private property' 53 assumes that they will do so. In this context,
questions of corporate opportunity do not really arise, at least between the owners
and the operators (ie managers), for they are one and the same:54 'the owners
manag[e] and the managers ow[n].'55
Numerically, these owner-operated companies may be the most common, but in
economic significance they are dwarfed by public companies. The latter are
characterised by a large number of shareholders, each usually owing an insigni-
ficant percentage of the total available shareholding. 56 As Berle and Means
recognised,57 the association between ownership and management is missing in
these companies. Collectively, shareholders still assert ultimate control (for
instance through their ability to vote for new directors), but individually they are
usually unable to play any active role in determining the company's direction. The
shareholders are investors, and their concern is with the company's bottom line.
5 8
Control of the company is left to other individuals who owe their position to
ability rather than to any shareholding.
59
This has consequences for the corporate opportunity doctrine: the separation of
ownership from control means that most shareholders are passive investors,
depending upon directors and other senior executives to advance their interests;
this includes identifying and then acquiring for the company those opportunities
that are suitable for its exploitation.
Through the line-of-business test, Guth refocussed the corporate opportunity
doctrine from protecting unauthorised exploitation of opportunities in which a
company had some pre-existing interest, to imposing an obligation upon certain
company fiduciaries to surrender opportunities to the company. Should the
fiduciary fail to surrender the opportunity, the courts would respond by declaring
the opportunity to be the company's and imposing a constructive trust over the
opportunity in favour of the company. The result was to enlarge the operation of
the corporate opportunity doctrine. Guth's recognition and response to this
new dimension largely accounts for the subsequent prominence of the line-of-
business test.
Imposition of limits to the expanded corporate opportunity doctrine
This expanded corporate opportunity doctrine was accompanied by an apprecia-
tion that the new, wider, obligation needed limits that recognised the fact that
companies are typically expansionist. As the court in Guth observed, '[t]o deny this
[process of expansion] would be to deny the history of industrial development.'
60
Indeed, except where a company is subject to the operation of legal constraints
53 Berle and Means, n 51 above, 113.
54 It could be of relevance for other parties, for instance creditors, when the diversion of an
opportunity could constitute a 'fraud' on them.
55 A. D. Chandler Jr, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1977) 9.
56 See B. R. Cheffins, 'Current Trends in Corporate Governance: Going From London to Milan
via Toronto' (1999) 10 Duke J Comp & Int'l L 5, 12.
57 n 51 above.
58 Cheffins, n 56 above, 13.
59 ibid 14.
60 Guth, n 18 above, 514.




such as the ultra vires doctrine, 61 it is generally free to pursue any and every
opportunity. As a result, unless the law assumes practical limits to the scope of the
company's business activities, each and every opportunity that a director or senior
employee becomes aware of might potentially come within the expanded notion of
corporate opportunity.
Four questions were therefore identified by the court in Guth as particularly
relevant in determining whether a corporate fiduciary should not pursue an
opportunity for personal benefit. 62 These questions are now treated as relevant in
determining whether the opportunity is a corporate opportunity. Collectively
referred to by some as the 'Guth Rule,' 63 they are firstly whether the opportunity
is, from its nature, in the company's line of business and is of practical advantage
to it; secondly whether the opportunity is one in which the company has an
interest or a reasonable expectancy; thirdly whether the opportunity brings the
self-interest of the officer or director into conflict with that of their company if the
officer or director embraces the opportunity; and finally whether the opportunity
is one that the company is financially able to undertake?
The first and last questions provide some of the now-necessary limits to the
operation of the expanded corporate opportunity doctrine. Although our concern
is with the last question, it is worth noting that in practice the requirement that the
opportunity be within the company's line of business provides the most important
limitation.
Despite Guth's express recognition of an impossibility argument, it is not enough
for a director to claim that it was financially impossible for the company to exploit
the opportunity. As the Deleware Supreme Court confirmed in Broz v Cellular
Information Sys Inc,64 the 'Guth Rules' are 'guidelines' only: '[n]o one [question] ...
is dispositive,' and 'all questions must be taken into account insofar as they are
applicable.' The Broz court also went on to emphasise the factual orientation of
the line-of-business test, observing that '[c]ases involving a claim of usurpation of
a corporate opportunity range over a multitude of factual settings. Hard and fast
rules are not easily crafted to deal with such an array of complex situations.'
65
Thus, rather than being a decisive consideration, the thrust of the impossibility
question is merely that if a company is financially unable to acquire or develop the
opportunity, the court should look more favourably on the director being able to
do so.
61 Pursuant to the ultra vires doctrine companies had no legal authority to enter into transactions
outside the scope of their objects. Nowadays a company is able to pursue any lawful
opportunity. US law recognized this earlier than English law. US companies have the capacity
to engage in any lawful business unless a more limited purpose is stated in the articles or
certificate of incorporation. Nevertheless and as a general rule, limitations on corporate
capacity have no effect on third parties. See H. Hovenkemp, 'The Classical Company in
American Legal Thought' (1988) 76 Geo LJ 1593, 1663-1664 (providing an overview of US
challenge to ultra vires). The Model Business Company Act, ss. 301 and 304; and Del Code Ann
tit 8, ss. 124 and s. 102(a)(3) (2000) are representative of the US position.
In the UK, the relaxation of the ultra vires doctrine is a more recent development with
progressive relaxations by the Companies Act 1985 (UK) and the Companies Act 1989 (UK).
While British companies must still state objects, s. 3A of the Companies Act 1985 defines the
object of a 'general commercial company' as carrying on any trade or business whatsoever.
Section 3A was inserted by the Companies Act 1989. Section 35 of the Companies Act 1985 (as
substituted by the Companies Act 1989) further restricts the ability of the company and third
parties to invoke the ultra vires doctrine. See generally Davies, n 3 above, 202-213.
62 Guth, n 18 above, 511.
63 Rapistan Corp v Michaels 511 NW2d 918, 922 (Mich Ct App 1998).
64 673 A2d 148, 154-155 (Del 1996).
65 ibid.
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In Guth, since Loft itself provided the resources to develop the Pepsi
opportunity, the impossibility question was irrelevant and, not surprisingly, the
court gave no meaningful guidance as to what constitutes a financial impossibility.
The orthodox approach in Delaware now, however, is to take a strict view. The
criterion used is whether the company is actually insolvent.66 If the company
simply lacks the funds to finance the development of the opportunity, courts can
be persuaded that the opportunity may be 'sufficiently unique and valuable
enough' 67 in itself to enable the necessary finance to be raised. Thus, even in
Delaware, financial impossibility arguments are hard to prove.
Extension to other impossibilities
Impossibility arguments are not limited to financial inability. Presumably
encouraged by Guth, US courts have been confronted with various arguments
to the effect that something that might otherwise be a corporate opportunity is not
one because the company is unable to pursue it.68 The reasons include third party
refusal to deal with the company in developing the opportunity;69 client
dissatisfaction with the company;70 and legal prohibitions. 7
1
The Guth Corollary
In the interests of completeness, it should be noted that the court in Guth identified
a further group of questions as relevant to determining whether a corporate
fiduciary's acquisition or development of an opportunity constituted dis-
loyalty to the company.72 These questions are sometimes referred to as the 'Guth
Corollary.' 73 They overlap in part with the Guth Rule, and ask firstly whether the
opportunity came to the officers or directors in their individual capacity, in
contrast to their official capacity; secondly whether the opportunity is essential to
the company; thirdly whether the company has any interest or expectancy in the
opportunity and finally whether the officer or director has wrongfully used the
company's resources in acquiring or developing the opportunity?
66 Stephanis v Yiannatsis No 1508, 1993 Del Ch LEXIS 228, * 12. Noted in Yiannatsis v Sterianou
653 A2d 275, 278 (Del 1994). There are indications that some courts may be willing to extend
their definition of financial inability to include 'temporary' insolvency and 'practical'
insolvency, see Yiannatsis ibid 279, n 2. See also Broz n 64 above, 155.
67 Schreiber v Bryan 396 A2d 512, 520 (Del 1978). Some courts infer that the company was
financially able to pursue an opportunity from the fact that the company's pursuit of the
opportunity would have benefitted it and served its interests. See Joyce v Cuccia No 14953, 1997
Del Ch LEXIS 71.
68 E. Talley, 'Turning Servile Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the Corporate
Opportunity Doctrine' (1998) 108 Yale LJ 277, 291.
69 See Energy Resources Corp Inc v Porter 438 NE2d 391 (Mass Ct App 1982). This argument was
unsuccessful and is discussed in the text to n 92-n 93 below.
70 See Cain v Cain 334 NE2d 650 (Mass Ct App 1975). There a director having the responsibility
of promoting the corporation's business, rather than passing on a major client's dissatisfaction
with the service it was receiving, established a competing transport business and acquired the
client's business. The court rejected the argument that that the client's dissatisfaction meant that
the opportunity was not the company's.
71 See Demoulas v Demoulas Super Markets, Inc 677 NE2d 159 (Mass 1997). This argument was
unsuccessful and it is discussed in the text to n 94 below.
72 Guth, n 18 above, 510-511.
73 Rapistan, n 63 above, 922.




The existence of the Guth Corollary further reiterates the earlier point that
impossibility is merely one of many considerations that are relevant in determining
the status of a potential corporate opportunity.
Other US responses
Despite all of this, these impossibility arguments remain controversial in the US.
The main reason is fear that 'the inevitable result [will be] to permit the diversion'
of the opportunity to the corporate fiduciary. 74 This is because it is 'too difficult to
verify' 75 the alleged impossibility 'on the basis of a set of facts largely within the
control of the director.' 76 The same concern has been noted in England, for
example by Lord Wright in Regal (Hastings).7 7 The problem is identified in
different ways, either it is 'too easy for the executive to indiice the unwillingness [ie
the impossibility]' 78 ; or it is too easy for the 'fiduciary's self-interest [to] cloud his
judgment' 79 and 'act as a disincentive to ... solve corporate financing and other
problems.'
80
The underlying concern is the problem of allowing corporate fiduciaries (or
other defendants) to be judges in their own cause. Indeed, it has been argued that
an underlying weakness with all impossibility arguments is that, 'if it made
economic or business sense to do so, a corporation probably could eliminate [the
problem]. ' 81
Adopting this approach, there is a considerable body of US case law rejecting
financial inability, and other impossibility arguments, as being decisive considerations.
Some courts have done so outright.82 Others have limited the application of such
arguments by insisting that there first be appropriate disclosure of the
impossibility and, following the disclosure, that the director has received the
appropriate consent to their exploitation of the opportunity. Typically, this
consent must be provided by the independent directors.
Although it predates Guth, Irving Trust Co v Deutsch83 is a prominent example
of the rejection of impossibility arguments. The Sonora Products Company of
America ('Sonora') had accepted an unconditional offer to buy stock in another
company and thereby acquire certain patent rights considered necessary for its
business. Deutsch, Sonora's President, was given the task of raising the necessary
funds to finance the purchase. Ultimately he advised that he was unable to do so,
and then, in conjunction with others, he personally purchased the stock. Deutsch's
argument that Sonora's financial inability excused his personal purchase was
successful before the trial court, but was rejected by the Court of Appeals.
Viewed against the trial court's finding of fact that Sonora was financially
unable to raise the funds, the Court of Appeals' rejection of Deutsch's argument
74 V. Brudney and R. Clark, 'A New Look at Corporate Opportunities' (1981) 94 Harv L Rev 998,
1021.
75 Energy Resources, n 69 above, 394. See also Northeast Harbor Golf Club, Inc v Harris 661 A2d
1146, 1149 (Me 1995).
76 Brudney and Clark, n 74 above, 1021.
77 n 2 above, 154.
78 Northeast Harbour, n 76 above, 1149.
79 Demoulas, n 71 above, 181.
80 Northeast Harbour, n 76 above, 1149. See also Irving Trust 73 F2d 121, 124 (CA 2nd Cir 1934).
81 Chew, n 20 above, 470-471.
82 See, for example, Foley v D'Agostino 248 NYS2d 121 (NY App 1964).
83 n 80 above.
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has been seen by some as a rejection of the relevance of the company's financial
ability in determining the nature of an opportunity. 84 Indeed, it has even been
suggested that this case establishes a 'rigid rule' 85 that precludes a fiduciary from
pursuing an opportunity that has been rejected by the company.
This rigid view of Irving Trust might be doubted, however, and there may be less
in the assertion that Guth and its line-of-business test takes a considerably 'more
relaxed view' 86 of the impossibility argument. The interesting but commonly
overlooked feature of Irving Trust is that, although the Court of Appeals accepted
the trial court's finding that Sonora lacked the funds to purchase the stock, it
expressed its unease about the finding.8 7 Deutsch personally owed Sonora some
$125,000, but no effort was made to collect this money. The court commented that
this:
tend[s],to show the wisdom of a rigid rule forbidding directors of a solvent company to take
over for their own profit a corporate contract on the plea of the company's financial inability
to perform. If the directors are uncertain whether the company can make the necessary
outlays, they need not embark it upon the venture [ie, enter into the contract]; if they do, they
may not substitute themselves for the company any place along the line and divert possible
benefits into their own pockets.
88
The end result is that although some courts have used Irving Trust to deny the
relevance of impossibility arguments, 89 other more recent cases from the same
Massachusetts jurisdiction reveal a shift to recognising the potential relevance of
impossibility arguments but imposing preconditions, such as disclosure, on their
success: see, for example, Energy Resources Corp Inc v Porter90 and Demoulas v
Demoulas Super Markets, Inc.91
Energy Resources involved the activities of the company's vice-president and
chief scientist, Porter. Porter was an expert in the staged fluidised bed combustion
of coal.92 On behalf of the company, Porter prepared an application with another
organization for a grant to develop this process. The involvement of the co-
applicant was important, if not crucial, to the application's success. Whilst
preparing the application, Porter was encouraged by the co-applicant to join with
it in presenting their own competing joint application. He did this, and they were
awarded the grant. Porter unsuccessfully argued that since co-applicant refused
to deal with the Energy Resources Corp Inc, the opportunity was not its
opportunity. The court observed:
For the reason that the firmness of a refusal to deal cannot be adequately tested by the
corporate executive alone, it has not been favored as a defense unless the refusal has first
been disclosed to the company. Without full disclosure it is too difficult to verify the
unwillingness to deal and too easy for the executive to induce the unwillingness ... 93
84 Durfee, n 21 above, 530.
85 Klinicki v Lundgren 695 P2d 906, 912 (Or 1985).
86 ibid 913.
87 Irving Trust, n 80 above, 124.
88 ibid 124.
89 Durfee, n 21 above, 530 (a Massachusetts case).
90 n 69 above.
91 n 71 above.
92 This is a process by which coal is mixed with limestone and then burned with the consequence
that the resulting sulfur is captured as a solid, rather than escaping escape into the atmosphere
as a gas: Energy Resources, n 69 above, 392.
93 ibid 394.
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The Demoulas case involved a family supermarket business, Demoulas Super
Markets Inc ('DMS'), founded by two brothers, George and Telemachus. By
1970, DMS owned a chain of fourteen supermarkets. When George died suddenly
in 1972, Telemachus assumed control. In the ensuing years, Telemachus
established a number of new companies with members of his immediate family
as the stockholders. Some of these new companies acquired new supermarkets.
The court held that the new supermarkets were corporate assets, and that DMS
had not consented to Telemachus's exploitation of them. In so doing it rejected the
argument that it was impossible for DMS to comply with New Hampshire liquor
laws restricting the number of liquor licenses any one supermarket chain could
have:
We disagree with this argument, which would limit a fiduciary's duty of disclosure to those
enterprises judged by the fiduciary to be within the company's leg#l, financial, or institutional
capabilities. Establishing such a threshold test for defining a corporate opportunity would
contradict the principle ... that a fiduciary who is interested in pursuing an opportunity
should not make the decision as to whether the venture is also of interest to the company.
Instead, to ensure fairness to the company, opportunities must be presented to the company
without regard to possible impediments, and material facts must be fully disclosed, so that
the company may consider whether and how to address these obstacles ... Without such a
rule, the fiduciary's self-interest may cloud his judgment or tempt him to overlook his
duties.
94
Guidance for English law
All this attention to US material should not disguise the fact that there are
significant differences between US law and English law, so care must be taken
when using US material in guiding reforms to English law. One important
difference, heralded in the earlier extract from Demoulas, is that US law has
developed a different conception of fiduciary loyalty demanded of corporate
fiduciaries. This is the duty of fairness or fair dealing. Originally developed to
evaluate self-dealing transactions, this duty has spread to influence the corporate
opportunity doctrine by introducing two incidental aspects into the line-of-
business test (and other corporate opportunity tests). These are a judicial
willingness to review a transaction's fairness; and the acceptance of a role for
disinterested directors in determining whether a director can personally exploit an
opportunity. The second aspect may be a product of the first, ie the availability of
judicial review, but its distinct influence is apparent. Associated with both is an
obvious emphasis on disclosure.
The scope and implications of this overarching duty of fairness or fair-dealing
cannot be appreciated without briefly considering their impact in self-dealing
transactions. Applied to such transactions, the duty provides that the transaction
is not voidable if: firstly it is fair to the corporation; or secondly it has been
authorised or ratified by disinterested directors; or thirdly it has been authorised
or ratified by a majority of disinterested shareholders. 95 A failure to disclose may
94 Demoulas, n 71 above, 181.
95 In Delaware there is uncertainty both over the requirements for effective shareholder
authorization/ratification and its consequences. See M. A. Jacobson, 'Interested Director
Transactions and the (Equivocal) Effects of Shareholder Ratification' (1996) 21 Del J Corp L
981.
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not make an otherwise fair contract voidable, but it may constitute a breach of a
distinct duty of disclosure, with the result that the fiduciary is required to account
for the resulting profits. Even if the transaction is voidable, the corporation can
elect to affirm it and seek an accounting of profits.
96
As one might anticipate with concepts as loose as fairness or fair dealing, US
courts have had trouble defining just what constitutes a fair self-dealing
transaction. A conventional starting point in determining what fairness entails
is the Supreme Court's opinion in Pepper v Litton.9 7 Considerations mentioned by
the court include 'good faith,' 'inherent fairness,' and 'arm's length bargain.'9
But, as commentators have dryly noted, each of these considerations 'is difficult to
apply,' 99 and their inter-relationship is unclear. Not surprisingly, 'judicial
development of the "fairness" concept has little uniformity.' o Insofar as it is
possible to summarize the Delaware approach, the key idea is the equation of
fairness with 'conduct by a theoretical, wholly independent board of directors
acting upon the matter before them. ' 10 1 The court's concern appears to be two-
fold, evaluating both the substantive fairness of the transaction and the procedure
by which the decision to enter into that transaction was made.
Of particular significance in understanding the US approach is an appreciation
of the unresolved tensions in its application. The scope of the duty may, it seems,
be modified by disinterested director approval so as to lessen the degree of
subsequent judicial scrutiny. Disclosure is important to shareholder and
disinterested director approval, but there are also indications that US courts
see disclosure as a necessary requirement of the duty of fairness, thereby making
disclosure a distinct duty. This approach is having its own discernable impact on
the scope of the corporate opportunity doctrine.
The growing US emphasis on disclosure
Initial support for the recognition of an independent duty of disclosure is provided
by a trio of Delaware decisions in which the Supreme Court used broad language
to extend the disclosure obligations of directors when dealing with share-
holders. 10 2 These cases are Lynch v Vickers Energy Corp,'0 3 Weinberger v UOP,
Inc,10 4 and Smith v Van Gorkom.
10 5
Lynch involved the corporate fiduciary's purchase of the corporation's stock
from a stockholder. The court described a duty of 'complete candor,' of 'complete
frankness ... [under which c]ompleteness, not adequacy, is both the norm and the
96 Hayes Oyster Co, State ex rel v Keypoint Oyster Co 391 P2d 979, 986 (Wash 1964).
97 308 US 295 (1939).
98 ibid 306. Formulations subsequently developed include 'intrinsic fairness' (Marciano v Nakash
535 A2d 400, 403-404 (Del 1987)) and 'entire fairness' (Geddes v Anaconda Copper Mining Co
254 US 590 (1920); Weinberger v UOP, Inc 457 A2d 701, 711 (Del 1983)).
99 A. Bulbulia and A. R. Pinto, 'Statutory Responses to Interested Directors' Transactions: A
Watering Down of Fiduciary Standards?' (1977) 53 Notre Dame Law Review 201, 223-224.
100 ibid.
101 Weinberger, n 98 above, 709 n 7. See also Johnston v Greene 121 A2d 919, 925 (Del 1956); Oberly v
Kirby 592 A.2d 445, 467 (Del 1989) ('[tlhe key to upholding an interested transaction is the
approval of some neutral decision-making body').
102 These cases are discussed by L. A. Hamermesh, 'Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The Corporate
Director's Fiduciary Disclosure Duty' (1996) 49 Vand L Rev 1087, 1117.
103 383 A 2d 278 (Del 1977).
104 n 98 above.
105 488 A 2d 858 (Del 1985).
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mandate'10 6 to hold that the fiduciary was required to disclose to the stockholder
his knowledge of corporate information which suggested that the price paid by the
fiduciary was unfairly low.
'[T]he obvious duty of candor required by Lynch' was used in Weinberger to
support the rule that 'one possessing superior knowledge may not mislead art
stockholder by use of corporate information to which the latter is not privy.'
1 0
There the nominee directors appointed by the majority stockholder did not
disclose the existence or results of a feasibility study that they had prepared for the
majority stockholder in preparation for a proposed buy-out by the majority
shareholder.
Smith concerned the degree of care the directors had taken in giving advice to
the stockholders on a merger proposal. The court held that the directors had
breached their fiduciary duties to be adequately informed before giving such
advice and in 'fail[ing] to disclose all material information such as a reasonable
stockholder would consider important'10 8 in voting on the merger proposal.
Further support for the recognition of an independent duty of disclosure is
provided by the New Jersey case of Cameco, Inc v Gedicke.10 9 Gedicke was a
middle manager in Cameco, responsible for arranging the transportation of its
food products to retail stores. This required Gedicke to co-ordinate shipping
schedules, negotiate shipping rates and supervise those employees involved in the
loading process. Unbeknown to Cameco, Gedicke and his wife formed a
corporation whose business was arranging the transportation of food products.
Two of its clients were Cameco's competitors. The substantive issue was whether
this service to competitors constituted disloyalty to Cameco, but the court's
attention focused on a procedural point. Moreover, a complete lack of factual
findings by the trial court also precluded 'a definitive analysis' of the substantive
issue.110 Nevertheless, the court emphasized the importance of disclosure to this
substantive issue, suggesting that 'employees generally should inform employers of
their plans before establishing an independent business that might conflict with
that of the employer,' so as to 'alert the employer to potential problems' and to
'protec[t] the employee from a charge of disloyalty. ' 111
The influence of disclosure on the corporate opportunity doctrine
The impact on the corporate opportunity doctrine of this growing emphasis on
disclosure is evident in Demoulas. Recall that there the court stressed the need to
disclose opportunities:
[T]o ensure fairness to the company, opportunities must be presented to the company
without regard to possible impediments, and material facts must be fully disclosed, so that
the company may consider whether and how to address these obstacles ... Without such a
rule, the fiduciary's self-interest may cloud his judgment or tempt him to overlook his
duties. 112
106 Lynch, n 103 above, 281.
107 Weinberger, n 98 above, 711.
108 Smith, n 105 above, 893.
109 724 A2d 783 (NJ 1999).
110 ibid 788.
111 ibid.
112 Demoulas, n 71 above, 181.
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Further, the court suggested that the corporate opportunity doctrine 'may be
considered to be a rule of disclosure.'1 13 The influence of mandatory disclosure is
also apparent in other tests, for example that suggested by the American Law
Institute ('ALI'). Indeed, ALl has been seen as recommending a 'bright-line'
approach pursuant to which 'disclosure is determinative.'1 14 Its proposed code
provides that:
a ... senior executive may not take advantage of a corporate opportunity [which includes,
'any opportunity to engage in a business activity of which a senior executive becomes aware
and knows is closely related to a business in which the corporation is engaged or expects to
be engaged'] unless: (1) the ... senior executive first offers that corporate opportunity to the
corporation and makes disclosure concerning the conflict of interest ... and the corporate
opportunity ... 115
Against this background it is not surprising that, even in Delaware, there is some
support for disclosure of the opportunity and then the company's rejection of it as
prerequisites to the success of an impossibility argument. 116
Additionally, there are practical considerations in the US emphasis on
disclosure. This is the need for certainty. In Guth, the court tried to provide
certainty by enumerating the factors comprising the Guth Rule and the Guth
Corollary. However, as the court observed in Broz:
The teaching of Guth and its progeny is that the director or officer must analyze the situation
ex ante to determine whether the opportunity is one rightfully belonging to the corporation.
If the director or officer believes, based on one of the factors articulated above [ie, the
questions identified in the Guth Rule and the Guth Corollary], that the corporation is not
entitled to the opportunity, then he may take it for himself.' 17
Of course, the corporate fiduciary's assessment is not decisive. The court in Broz
noted that 'an error in the fiduciary's assessment of the situation will create future
liability for breach of fiduciary duty.'
118
Some corporate fiduciaries are unwilling to assume the risk that their assessment
of the opportunity's status is wrong, yet they still wish to pursue the opportunity
personally. The solution has been to extend the application of the safe-harbour
applied in self-dealing transactions. The corporate fiduciary can inform the board
of the opportunity and seek its authorization to pursue it. If disinterested directors
give this authorization, the 'spectre of a post hoc judicial determination' that the
corporate fiduciary 'has improperly usurped a corporate opportunity is
removed.' 11 9
Irrespective of whether disclosure is seen as an independent duty or a prudent
step, the growing US emphasis on disclosure is undermining the significance of
any recognition they give to impossibility arguments. As a result, there may be no
significant difference in practical terms between the UK Steering Group's
113 ibid 180.
114 See Ostrowski v AverY, 703 A2d 117, 125-126 (Conn 1997); Northeast Harbor, n 76 above,
1151-1152.
115 Corporate Governance, n 21 above, § 5.05(a).
116 Fliegler v Lawrence 361 A2d 218, 219 (Del 1976). See also Cellular Information Sys, Inc v Broz
663 A2d 1180, 1186 (Del Ch 1995) but cf Broz, n 64 above, 157.
117 Broz, n 64 above, 157.
118 ibid.
119 ibid. See also A Teixeira & Co, Inc v Teixeira, 699 A2d 1383, 1388 (RI, 1997) (recognizing the
safe-harbour concept).




recommendation and the position US law appears to be moving towards.
Respectively, these are rejecting impossibility arguments but allowing independent
directors to authorise another's personal exploitation of the opportunity (the
Steering Group's recommendation); and recognising impossibility arguments, but
requiring disclosure and confirmation by independent directors of that impossi-
bility and, either directly or by implication, authorisation of the director's
personal exploitation of the opportunity (the position US law appear to be
moving to).
Should English law recognise impossibility arguments?
Returning to English law and the debate on impossibility arguments, many will
argue that there is an inherent attractiveness, if not logic, in the impossibility
arguments. This is displayed in the question: 'How can an opportunity be a
company's if the company is unable to exploit it?'
This attractiveness or logic may explain in part Guth's acceptance that financial
impossibility is one of a number of relevant considerations. However, this
recognition raises practical concerns that have resulted in the development of
discrete controls on the test, including narrow conceptions of impossibility, ie
requirements of actual insolvency and the imposition of disclosure and
authorisation requirements, the effect of which is to restrict the availability of
impossibility arguments.
There is, however, a more significant objection to impossibility arguments than
these practical concerns. The recognition of the impossibility argument per se is
inconsistent with the modern expectation that the director's role, especially the
executive director's role, is to 'promote the success of the company.' 120 Guth
recognised one aspect of this: that the director's task was to identify business
opportunities for the company's exploitation. But, as recognised in some of the
US material rejecting impossibility arguments, 121 there is another aspect to this:
the director must also identify impediments confronting the company (eg financial
problems), and then either develop strategies to overcome them or evaluate the
strategies proposed by others.
122
Unconditional acceptance of the availability of impossibility arguments raises
real prospects of conflicts of interest. A director who is able to raise impossibility
arguments may face the 'temptation to refrain from exerting [their] strongest
efforts on behalf of the company since, if [the company] does not meet the
obligations, an opportunity of profit will be open to [the fiduciary] personally.
' 123
Regal (Hastings)124 demonstrates that English courts appreciate the conflict
between impossibility arguments and the director's role in overcoming difficulties
confronting the company in pursuing an opportunity. 125 There, the company had
been actively pursuing the acquisition of a lease of certain cinemas before
120 To use the language of the draft Companies Bill, White Paper-Draft Clauses, n 9 above, Sched 2,
para 2.
121 Discussed in the text to n 74-n 81 above.
122 See Note, 'Corporate Opportunity' (1961) 74 Harv L Rev 765, 773 ('Every major executive ...
would seem obligated to make a genuine effort to enable the company to secure the additional
profit').
123 Irving Trust, n 80 above, 124.
124 n 2 above.
125 It is present in the 'trust' opportunity case of Keech v Sandford, n 4 above.
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encountering the landlord's requirements, which apparently precluded its
acquisition of the leases. Their Lordships did not suggest that the defendant
fiduciaries would be successful in their attempts to find ways for the company to
satisfy the landlord's requirements, and thereby enable the company to acquire the
opportunity, but nevertheless they would not permit the directors to raise these
difficulties to justify their personal acquisition of the opportunity.
Another example is Industrial Development Consultants Ltd v Cooley.126 Cooley
was 'an architect of considerable distinction and attainment' 127 in the gas industry.
In conjunction with other companies, the plaintiff company provided a
comprehensive construction service, largely in the private sector. Wishing to
expand into the public sector and gas industry, the plaintiff successfully invited
Cooley to become its managing director. Later Cooley was approached personally
with an offer to become the project manager for certain projects in the gas
industry. Cooley did not advise the company of this opportunity, but resigned to
pursue it. In his defence, Cooley argued, and the court accepted, that the party
offering the contract would have been unlikely to have employed the plaintiff
company.1 28 Nevertheless, the court rejected this impossibility argument on the
ground that it was Cooley's job as the managing director 'to try and persuade [the
other party] to change their minds.'129 The court's recognition of the inconsistency
between the impossibility argument and Cooley's role is captured in the following
fuller extract of its grounds for rejection:
It cannot be said that it is anything like certain that the plaintiff would ever have got this
contract. ... On the other hand, there was always the possibility of the plaintiffs persuading
the [party offering the contract] ... to change their minds; and, ironically enough, it would
have been the defendant's duty to try and persuade them to change their minds. It is a
curious position under which he whose duty it would have been to seek to persuade them to
change their minds should not say that the plaintiffs suffered no loss because he would never
have succeeded in persuading them to change their minds.130
As Lawrence Collins J subsequently observed in CMS Dolphin Ltd v Simonet,13 1
'what he [Cooley] did was to divert to himself the very type of contract it was his
job to secure for the company (even though it was very unlikely that the company
would have won the contract).'
Conclusion
The line-of-business test (and, as part of that test, the US recognition of the
impossibility argument) arose from an appreciation that company directors have a
role in advancing their company's interests. This test expanded the concept of
corporate opportunity from an opportunity in which the company had an interest,
or a recognised expectancy of acquiring, to an opportunity that the company
could exploit profitably. For some companies, however, any potential opportunity
could fall within this wide test. 132 In order to provide some necessary limits to the





131 [2001] 2 BCLC 704 at [90].
132 Brudney and Clark, n 74 above, 1004.
© The Modern Law Review Limited 2003
[Vol. 66
Corporate Opportunity Doctrine
line-of-business test, courts added additional constraints, such as requiring the
company to be financially or otherwise able to acquire or exploit the opportunity.
Even though the director's practical role was, indirectly, a reason for recognising
impossibility arguments, it is also a reason for viewing those arguments with
suspicion. Directors must evaluate the impediments (or impossibilities) that
appear to prevent their company from pursuing attractive opportunities, and must
then either develop strategies to overcome the impediments or consider strategies
proposed by others. So, despite the US recognition of impossibility arguments, it
is not surprising that modern US practice is to make such arguments difficult to
prove and to curtail their impact through the development of satellite rules. The
emphasis on disclosure, especially, has ensured that a director who wishes to
pursue an opportunity cannot simply conclude, privately, that it is impossible for
the company to pursue it.
The end result is that, in practice, there may be no significant difference between
the UK Steering Group's recommendations and the position US law now appears
to be moving towards. Despite this, there are certain advantages in the Steering
Group's formulation of the rules. As a matter of principle, the rejection of
impossibility arguments is more consistent with a director's role and its
requirement to avoid conflicts of interest. A director's ability to exploit an
opportunity personally should not depend upon some private evaluation of
whether or not the opportunity is capable of exploitation by the company. Any
necessary flexibility is better provided by allowing the board of directors to
specifically authorise the exploitation.
The UK Steering Group's implicit recommendation that the status of a
corporate opportunity should not depend upon whether the opportunity is
capable of exploitation by the company should be followed. The Government's
White Paper does this.
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